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 Foreword 
This paper has been produced under the umbrella of the DIE research project “Development 
Policy: Questions for the Future”, funded by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ). A primary objective of this research project is to stimulate thinking 
about how the context that development policy responds to could change in the long-term.  In 
the face of a changing global development landscape, one challenge that European donors 
currently confront is the adaptation of their development cooperation systems to address 
internal deficits and prepare for new external demands. Within Europe, this adaptation 
process will take place both within the bilateral development cooperation systems of the 
European Union (EU) Member States and at the EU level. Against a backdrop of ongoing 
reforms in the EU’s external relations apparatus, Mikaela Gavas, Simon Maxwell, and 
Deborah Johnson of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) offer a discussion in this 
paper of the different roles that the EU might be able to play as a development actor in the 
future. Their work highlights the importance of continuing to critically examine the 
comparative advantages of the EU in global development as EU external relations reforms 
move forward.  
 
 
 
 
 
Erik Lundsgaarde Bonn, June 2010 
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Executive Summary 
Two competing visions lie at the heart of debate about the future of EU development 
cooperation. They are: first, that there is a strong case for the European Community (EC) to 
play a greater part in shaping policy and delivering programmes; or, conversely, second, that 
the EC role is one of coordination and network management, rather than actual delivery. We 
conceptualise this as a “swingometer” in which different visions lead to a pendulum being 
positioned in different places along a continuum from consolidation to cooperation. In most 
policy areas, the pendulum will lie somewhere between complete consolidation and complete 
coordination: a patchwork of laws, rules and practices operates across the development space. 
The development agenda is evolving in what can be thought of as a consolidationist direction. 
The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has dominated the 
development agenda for over a decade, and has directed attention to national development 
policy. However, while the MDGs remain an important focus, increasing attention is being 
paid to international policy issues, like climate change and financial stability. This is reflected 
in the increasing priority being given in the EC to coherence between aid, trade, migration, 
climate, security and other policies. 
Consolidation will not be easy to deliver, however. A review of theory suggests that specific 
conditions need to be met for the EU to become more consolidated. These include the legal 
framework, of course, but also the way in which the scope for collaboration is defined, the 
rules of engagement, the decision-making framework, the underlying values, and the interests 
of Member States. At present, the forces are pushing in a cooperativist rather than 
consolidationist direction for development policy. 
A survey of senior policy-makers confirms this. Respondents recognise the importance of a 
new development agenda and acknowledge the value of collective action. They confirm the 
value-added of “Europe” in tackling global problems. They see improvements in the 
performance of the EC. They support greater cooperation in setting standards and working 
together to improve aid effectiveness. They oppose greater consolidation, for example of aid 
budgets. 
Four conclusions can be suggested: 
– First, it is worth bearing in mind that the scope for pendulum swings is partly shaped by 
the Treaty. There is little point, for example, in arguing for less consolidation on trade 
policy or more on foreign and security policy, unless the argument is also to change the 
treaty.  Legal competence is a determining factor, although not the only one. 
– Second, a theoretical implication is that no single integration theory, no single variable 
explains the location of the pendulum. Policy areas and the distribution of legal 
competences in the EU, institutional factors, the Member States’ constellation of interests 
and identity all need to be taken into account.   
– Third, it looks as though the “quick wins” will be on the cooperation side of the pendulum: 
in setting standards and targets, working together on aid effectiveness, and improving 
information collection and dissemination. 
– Fourth, the arguments for future consolidation are not negligible. The case will need to be 
made more strongly, however. 
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In practical terms, the cooperation-consolidation debate will play out in Brussels in the 
context of the new institutional architecture and the evolving development agenda.  The 
establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) will result in some of the 
chess pieces being moved around the board – in particular, some policy and programming 
responsibilities units moving into the new EEAS. An overarching question will be: what 
capacity is needed to run a global development programme, including a € 10 billion per year 
aid agency? 
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1 Consolidation or cooperation: Two visions of the future of EU 
development cooperation 
Two competing visions lie at the heart of debate about the future of EU development 
cooperation1. They are: 
— First, that there is a strong case for the European Community (EC) to play a greater part 
in shaping policy and delivering programmes; or, conversely, 
— Second, that the EC role is one of coordination and network management, rather than 
actual delivery. 
In the first vision, which we call the consolidation model, the EC sets policy and to a large 
extent implements it. For example, that could mean a larger share of development aid being 
channelled through Brussels and a smaller share through the bilateral programmes of Member 
States. 
In the second vision, which we call the cooperation model, the EC concentrates on 
constructing a shared framework of policy and coordination within which individual Member 
States implement independent programmes2.  
We conceptualise this as a “swingometer” (Figure 1) in which different visions lead to a 
pendulum being positioned in different places along a continuum from consolidation to 
cooperation3. In most policy areas, the pendulum will lie somewhere between complete 
consolidation and complete coordination. In aid, for example, the share of EU aid channelled 
through the EC is currently only about 20 % (EuropeAid 2009), and falling. This suggests that 
the cooperation model prevails. From this perspective, the “European Consensus on 
Development” can be considered as providing a shared framework; and the “Code of Conduct 
on Division of Labour in Development Policy” can be considered as setting the rules of 
engagement within which Member States deliver bilateral programmes4. Nevertheless, a 20 % 
share means that the EC is currently disbursing some € 10 billion a year, which makes the 
European Commission a large aid donor in its own right, and at least a proto-consolidator.  
If development cooperation is taken in the narrow sense, mainly to cover aid, there is 
legislative support for both the cooperation and consolidation positions. The Lisbon Treaty 
declares development cooperation to be a ‘shared competence’ in which both the Commission 
and Member States play a part. The precise wording states that:  
 
                                                 
1  We use the term “EC” to describe activities led by Brussels institutions, “EU” to describe Brussels and 
Member States. There are three visions if the Eurosceptic position (that there should be no EC development 
cooperation at all) is included. We leave aside that distraction for now. 
2  In international relations terms, these models are sometimes called supranational/centralised or coordinated/ 
decentralised. 
3  The placement of the pendulum in Figure 1 is arbitrary. 
4  The text of the European Consensus on Development is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/ 
icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf. For the EU Code of Conduct please see http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0072:FIN:EN:PDF. 
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“In the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have 
competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy; however, the exercise 
of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising 
theirs”.  
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2008), article 4) 
There is enough flexibility – ambiguity – here for either vision to prevail.  
The position is more difficult to define if the boundaries of development cooperation are set 
more widely. Development cooperation has links to many other policy fields that invoke 
different parts of the Lisbon Treaty and different degrees of EC competence. The EU has 
conceptualised development cooperation as involving or touching on issues as diverse as: 
foreign and security policy; defence; trade; agriculture; environment; migration; fisheries; and 
many others. The formal Treaty-based “competence” of the EU is different across these 
sectors, with some (for example, trade, fisheries) being within the exclusive competence of 
the Union, and thus necessarily consolidationist; and others (agriculture, environment) falling 
within the sphere of shared competence.  
In practice, there are different ways of working along the spectrum from cooperation to 
consolidation. Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry identify three models of governance: unconditional 
delegation, supervised delegation and coordination with other Member States and EU 
institutions (Coeuré / Pisani-Ferry 2007). Figure 2 illustrates the different levels of integration 
across issue areas. In cases where the issue lies within the EU’s exclusive competence, the 
Community acts through the European Commission, which is assisted by the Member States 
(for example, the “Article 133 committee” for trade policy). In cases of shared competence, 
the Presidency usually represents the EU on the basis of a position coordinated within a 
Figure 1: Consolidate or cooperate – the EU swingometer 
 
 
Source: own illustration 
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committee composed of the Member States and the Commission. In areas of national 
competence, Member States may in principle speak for themselves, but they often coordinate 
their positions. 
Figure 2: Models of governance 
 Development 
policy 
Trade policy Foreign policy Competition 
policy 
Competence Shared (EU policy 
alongside Member 
States’ policies) 
Exclusive for goods 
and most services; 
shared for audiovisual, 
educational, cultural, 
social and human 
health services 
National Exclusive 
Governance 
model 
Mix of supervised 
delegation to EU 
Presidency or 
Commission and 
coordination 
Supervised delegation 
to Commission 
Coordination Unconditional 
delegation to 
Commission 
External 
representation 
Commission and 
Member States 
Commission (based on 
Council authorisation) 
Member States 
(with the High 
Representative) 
Commission 
Source: own compilation 
The result is a patchwork of laws, rules and practices operating across the development space. 
The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty opens a new debate, with some hoping that the 
appointment of a permanent President of the Council and of a High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as the establishment of the new European 
External Action Service, will lead to more consolidation, and others insisting on the continued 
relevance of a model focused on coordination5.  
Are there any principles governing the placement of the pendulum on different issues? To 
explore this, we begin by summarising briefly the emerging development issues in a world 
recovering from the global financial crisis and facing new challenges like climate change. 
Recent policy work suggests that there will be more need in the future than hitherto for policy 
coherence and multilateral approaches. This looks like a consolidationist agenda (Section 2). 
Whether this will materialise is a more difficult issue. A review of integration theory and 
experience suggests that quite specific conditions have to be met if consolidation is to take 
place – and that these are not met in the context of European development cooperation 
(Section 3).  
To try and take the argument beyond theory, we have attempted an alternative and pragmatic 
approach, by collecting the views of policy-makers in development through an expert survey 
(Section 5). This survey enables a more detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the EC. Although the small sample size means that survey must be treated as indicative rather 
than definitive, it is nevertheless useful because it points to the potential opportunities that 
                                                 
5  For a discussion of these issues, see European Think-Tanks Group (2010). 
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policy-makers are likely to pursue in the near term. There is enthusiasm for greater 
cooperation; little for greater consolidation. 
Our main conclusion (Section 6) follows. It is that the “quick wins” are likely to be on the 
cooperation side of the pendulum, especially in the areas of target and standard-setting, and 
working together on aid effectiveness. Greater consolidation may remain a longer-term 
objective, however. 
2 Emerging development challenges and the case for consolidation 
The two decades from 1990 to 2010 were marked by a strong focus on poverty reduction as 
the over-arching goal of development policy, and a strong focus on the national policies of 
developing countries as the primary vehicle for achieving the objective. At the beginning of 
the period, the 1990 World Development Report6 of the World Bank and the first Human 
Development Report7 of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) put poverty 
and human development firmly at the centre of the development agenda. By 1996, the focus 
on poverty had been crystallised in the OECD/DAC International Development Targets8, 
which later formed the basis of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals9 (MDGs). And in 
the years following the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in 2000, there was 
unremitting focus on the MDGs. International issues were present, especially trade, but in 
relatively muted fashion. If the MDGs are represented in a logical framework matrix, as in 
Figure 2, the objective was clear, and the main focus was on national policy in developing 
countries, supported, of course, by aid. The international policy environment was represented 
mainly by a weak environmental goal (MDG Goal 7) and by the notoriously incoherent and 
weak MDG Goal 8. 
 
By the second half of the 2000s, it was clear that the balance between national and 
international policy needed to be redressed.  A trade deal remained elusive.  Climate emerged 
as a major issue. International security was a continuing concern. Pandemics and other disease 
threats were high on the agenda. In 2006, one of us (Maxwell) identified divergent 
development agendas in the 20 % and 0.2 % Clubs of developing countries, the former (where 
aid might amount to 20 % of GNP) being focused on aid effectiveness and the social MDGs, 
                                                 
6  See: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/12/13/000178830 
_98101903345649/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf 
7  See: http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1990/ 
8  See: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/35/2508761.pdf 
9  See: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ 
Figure 3: A logical framework for development 
Goal Well-being 
Purpose Poverty reduction, human development 
Outputs Favourable national policy environment Favourable international policy 
environment 
Source: own compilation 
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the latter (where aid was much less important) more interested in trade, finance and 
technology (Maxwell 2006). By 2007, it could be noted that:  
“The key question is whether the Millennium Development Goals provide sufficient 
purchase for current development policy.[…] The agenda is changing […] in three 
important ways. China is reshaping the global economy, especially through its impact on 
the manufacturing prospects of poor countries. Security issues are everywhere rising up 
the agenda. And the focus on national development strategies is being supplemented in 
different ways by regional and global issues: climate change is the obvious example, but 
there are many others.[…] We miss all this at our peril. An analogy I have drawn is with 
a visit to a game park. All eyes and lenses are focused on the lioness and her cubs on one 
side of the car. Meanwhile, on the other, unnoticed, a large bull elephant advances[…].” 
(Maxwell 2007) 
By the end of the decade, the global food and financial crises had combined to demonstrate 
the importance of global interconnections and the need for concerted global action. This is not 
to say that the MDGs are unimportant, or that a focus on issues such as child malnutrition or 
maternal mortality is not required.  It is rather to emphasise that national spending on its own 
is insufficient, even when supported by aid. As the financial crisis10 showed, individual 
welfare in developing countries is greatly affected by export opportunities and export markets, 
by remittances, and by movements in foreign direct investment and portfolio flows.  As the 
angst generated by climate talks also illustrates, the welfare of the poorest in vulnerable 
developing countries rests heavily on the carbon policies of countries in other parts of the 
world.  
These shifts in the development agenda have implications both for policy and for the 
organisation of development cooperation. In particular, they make the case for two major 
changes: 
— First, a shift from thinking about development in terms of aid to thinking about whole-of-
Government approaches, covering trade, financial, security and environmental policy, as 
well as aid. In EU parlance, this is often described as “policy coherence for devel-
opment”.11 
— Second, a more multilateral approach – partly because “competence” on some aspects of 
the international agenda is vested in supra-national institutions, but more importantly 
because managing global problems requires investment in collective action.  
Some donor governments have recognised the implications of the changing development 
landscape and have begun to adapt global development strategies accordingly. The UK 
Government, for example, published an international development White Paper in 2009 
(DFID 2009). This paper made a strong case for putting shared global interests at the heart of 
development partnerships, and also made a strong commitment to multilateral approaches. It 
argued that:  
“The current challenges highlight just how interdependent we are. No country can afford 
to ignore them. No country acting alone can address them. But by acting together, we 
can create a fairer, safer and sustainable future”. 
(Ibid., 103) 
                                                 
10  See, for example: http://www.odi.org.uk/themes/financial-crisis/  
11  See: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r12534_en.htm  
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In terms of framing the collective action problem, the White Paper argued that:  
“Our international organisations and partnerships are the foundation for a co-operative 
world. They do more than just provide financing. Through them we can aspire to:  
— new international agreements on global issues. These are the means for ensuring all 
countries, including the poorest, have a voice in global solutions, and that we hold  
each other to account.  
— better international standards, on issues that matter to all of us – like human rights, 
the environment, and the economy. 
— development programmes on a scale bilateral donors can’t match and in places we 
can’t reach.  
— accelerated progress on development, through new partnerships and new financing.  
— a fast, effective response in the face of humanitarian and security crises.” 
(Ibid, 104) 
Other donors have begun to take similar positions. For example, a recent paper feeding into an 
ongoing debate on the future of development cooperation in the Netherlands argues that:  
“Development itself will increasingly become regional and global in character. As a 
result of issues like climate, trade, migration, energy and security, national policy will 
decreasingly be a sole determinant factor; the pressure to take global action and to make 
global agreements will only increase.” 
(WRR Scientific Council for Government Policy  2010) 
None of this will be unfamiliar to the EU, which has long combined aid with other 
development policies, sometimes embedded in formal partnership contracts like the Cotonou 
Agreement, and sometimes not. For example, its recent work on policy coherence has covered 
areas such as trade, climate change, security and migration (EC 2009b).  
In principle, a new focus on interdependence and global public goods should drive a more 
consolidationist agenda.  For example, when the EU speaks with one voice at climate 
negotiations, its representatives need the support of consolidated statistics and research.  They 
are also in a stronger position if they are able to commit funding on a collective basis. 
A consolidationist agenda is also implied by arguments about EC comparative advantage. 
According to the European Consensus on Development, the EC brings comparative advantage 
or added value in a number of respects: its global presence, its promotion of policy coherence 
for development, its specific competence and expertise, its right of initiative at community 
level, its facilitation of coordination and harmonisation and its supranational character. All are 
of “special significance” (EC 2005). 
3 Lessons of European integration 
We have seen that the emerging development agenda suggests that the case for consolidation 
in European development cooperation may be strengthening – and the EU itself has 
recognised as much. However, a review of thinking on European integration more generally 
suggests that certain conditions have to be met if consolidation is to occur. There are different 
theoretical perspectives, but they can be aggregated into a single template. 
Consolidation or cooperation: The future of EU development cooperation 
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First, a neofunctionalist approach suggests that over time, EU institutions acquire more 
competences within and across issue areas. Neofunctionalism anticipates spill-over effects 
from one issue area to another, and from economic to political sectors, as the EU moves 
closer towards a supranational community (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). A functional 
spillover may result from the lobbying efforts of civil society, or a political recognition that 
the problem can no longer be satisfactorily solved at national level, or a spillover engineered 
by the Commission.   
Second, an institutional approach understands integration as a function of both internal and 
external institutional factors. In spite of potential gains from collective action, institutional 
constraints emanating from the EU may prevent reform. For example, Reiter argues that EU 
Member States are more reluctant to act collectively if the institution deals with a broadly 
defined area of cooperation (Reiter 2005). In international fora, the level of collective action 
is likely to be higher in case of consensus-based decision-making, a narrow scope and binding 
rule of international cooperation, as well as in case of an inclusive membership of all EU 
Member States in the institution. For example, EU Member States in the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are reluctant to act collectively given the broad 
scope of the organisation, its focus on best practices and soft law, as well as the dominance of 
EU countries in the total membership and the fact that not all EU Member States are part of 
the organisation (ibid., 158). In comparison, in the World Trade Organization, “the EU 
Member States have a shared interest to agree to act as a single entity” and the well-defined 
scope of the organisation means “that intense coordination poses less of a threat to the EU 
Member States” (ibid.). 
A third strand of work, liberal intergovernmentalism, argues that progress in European 
integration has followed from the convergence of the economic interests of important 
domestic groups in major European countries (Moravcsik 1998). From this perspective, there 
is an inherent tendency towards lowest common denominator outcomes, and supranational 
solutions are only put in place in the EU when necessary to make credible commitments (e.g. 
to constrain and control the other governments). The EU itself is regarded as an international 
institution (rather than a global actor). From such a perspective, especially the larger EU 
Member States are reluctant to pool sovereignty and consolidate. Adopting a common policy 
requires that Member States weigh the potential benefits of a common policy against the 
potential costs of a policy that is not to their liking. Hence, there is a clear trade-off between 
the advantages of scale and the disadvantages of overriding heterogeneous preferences. For 
example, although the EU has an official role in aid coordination, in reality the EC acts 
mostly as a 28th donor.  
Finally, social constructivism argues that agents and structures are mutually constitutive and 
that “power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up” 
(Wemdt 1999). Actors follow socially defined norms, driven by the “logic of appropriateness” 
and feelings of identity (rather than mere utility maximisation). Social learning is considered 
more likely among actors sharing values, facing crises or policy failure, meeting repeatedly 
with a high density of interaction and being insulated from direct political pressure and 
exposure (Checkel 1999). Once EU Member States start to coordinate their policies, they may 
become increasingly “Europeanised”. Groenleer and van Schaik, for instance, find with 
regard to the negotiations on climate change that “Member State representatives appear to 
have been ‘socialised’ by the interaction during the frequent meetings taking place in 
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Brussels and the EU coordination meetings at international conferences” (Groenleer / van 
Schaik 2007).  
Pulling these ideas together, Figure 4 summarises the conditions under which consolidation 
and cooperation are most likely. In respect of development cooperation, the balance appears 
weighted on the side of cooperation rather than consolidation, at least for the time being. This 
is a field in which competence is mostly shared, as we have seen, and in which soft law 
dominates. Although norms and values are converging, as the adoption of the European 
Consensus on Development illustrates, individual Member States still have different interests, 
for example with regard to the geographical focus of their aid. Furthermore, spillovers appear 
relatively limited in this field. 
 
4 An analysis of current opinion 
To provide further help on where to locate the pendulum, an expert survey was designed, to 
test the opinions of a group of policy-makers and practitioners. The group was non-random 
and the sample small (a group of approximately 40), but all respondents were senior 
participants in European development cooperation. They had previously participated in events 
organised by the European Development Cooperation Support Programme (http:// 
international-development.eu), including seminars and an e-discussion on the future of 
European development cooperation.   
Amongst the participants, the two largest groups represented were national civil servants and 
academics / think tanks, with significant representation also from the European Commission 
and NGOs. Other respondents were, inter alia, from development finance institutions, national 
development agencies and a private foundation. Twelve nationalities were represented within 
Figure 4: Conditions under which consolidation/cooperation are more likely 
Consolidation more likely Cooperation more likely 
Exclusive competence Shared competence 
High spillovers Low spillovers 
Narrowly defined areas of collaboration Broadly defined areas of collaboration 
Binding rules of international cooperation  Soft law 
Consensus-based decision-making Majority decision-making 
Similar Member States’ interests, preferences and 
policy positions 
Heterogeneous Member States’ interests, preferences 
and policy positions 
Equal power distribution Unequal power distribution 
Shared norms Lack of shared norms 
Source: own compilation 
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the group. Of significance to the results, 60 % of all respondents represented only three of the 
Member States: the UK, Germany and the Netherlands.  These three Member States represent 
a spread of commitment to aid spending through Brussels, with Germany spending around 
20 % of its aid budget through the EC, the UK approximately 18 % and the Netherlands 
around only 9 %12. 
The questionnaire is reproduced in the Annex. Respondents were asked to comment on five 
questions: 
a) the evolving development agenda; 
b) the comparative advantage of the EU in dealing with this agenda; 
c) the EC’s contribution across a range of outputs, from collecting information to delivering 
aid;  
d) the reasons for good and bad performance; and  
e) the future role of the EC.  
a. The evolving development agenda 
Respondents to the survey were asked to evaluate how important they thought various global 
issues will be in EU policy-making over the next decade.13 They were then asked to compare 
this to how important they felt these issues should be. The data (Figure 5) highlight several 
points of interest.  
First, respondents confirmed the expected importance of the new drivers of development 
policy.  According to the opinion of the group, both energy security and climate change will 
be the foremost issues in EU policy-making over the next decade, followed by peace and 
security, migration and terrorism.     
Second, respondents articulated a fear that the traditional poverty focus of development would 
be weakened.  It was overwhelmingly agreed that poverty should be the most important issue 
in policy-making, with 91 % of respondents taking the position, followed by global food 
security.  This contrasted markedly with the importance respondents felt these two issues will 
have in reality over the next decade, where global food security and poverty were predicted to 
be low on the list of priority issues (4th and 5th least important respectively).   
                                                 
12  According to OECD-DAC figures 2008. 
13  For each question, respondents were asked to score on a scale of 1-5, where 1 = a low score of importance/ 
performance and 5 = high. Responses were weighted according to their position on the scale; the figures 
reported here are the mean score.     
 Mikaela Gavas / Deborah Johnson / Simon Maxwell 
12 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
 
b. The comparative advantage of the EU in dealing with the evolving development 
agenda 
Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of six specific comparative advantages: 
shared values, a commitment to poverty reduction, shared approaches in development policy 
(as laid out in the European Consensus on Development), new structures, a variety of political 
and economic partnerships, and economies of scale in funding instruments (European Think-
Tanks Group 2010).   
Figure 6 shows that all were thought to be important.  The EU’s commitment to poverty 
reduction in the world was believed to be the most important comparative advantage, 
followed very closely by shared values and economies of scale in funding instruments, in that 
order. Of slightly less importance were shared approaches in development policy and the 
EU’s variety of international political and economic partnerships, with the new structures – 
particularly the new High Representative and the team of Commissioners – being of least 
importance.     
Figure 5: Comparison of what should and what will be the important issues in EU policy-making  
 over the next decade 
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c. The EC’s contribution across a range of outputs 
Given that multilateral organisations commonly deliver a range of outputs, respondents were 
asked to state how important it is, in their opinion, that the EC deliver on a given range of 
outputs, from collecting information to delivering aid (Figure 7)14. They were then asked to 
evaluate how well they believed the EC delivered these outputs in practice.  All seven given 
outputs were considered to be of considerable importance overall, with the preparation and 
negotiation of international treaties or conventions the most important output and direct action 
(development, humanitarian and peacekeeping activities) the least.   
However, on all outputs (with the exception of direct action, where theoretical importance 
matched delivery in practice), the EC fell short in practice on delivery. Survey respondents 
believed that the EC delivered particularly badly on information collection and dissemination, 
as a result of poor communication, and jointly undertaken research on cross-cutting issues.  In 
other areas the shortfall is smaller. 
                                                 
14  This list was adapted from Maxwell (1999). 
Figure 6: The importance of specific EU comparative advantages 
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d. Reasons for good and bad performance of the EU/EC in development  
 cooperation 
Respondents were asked to state how well, in their opinion, the EC is currently performing in 
the sphere of development cooperation, on a scale of 1–5, where 1 = very poorly and 5 = very 
well.  The majority of respondents (78 %) scored current performance as either a 3 or a 4, 
with the remaining 22 % scoring performance as a 2. However, respondents were then asked 
to state how they thought the EC performs today compared to ten years ago. 74 % of 
respondents believed that there had been improvement, with only 26 % of respondents 
indicating that performance was neither better nor worse.  No-one believed performance had 
deteriorated.   
Respondents were then asked to evaluate the importance of given factors in determining how 
well the EU/EC performs in the sphere of development cooperation (Figure 8). The two most 
important factors were believed to be leadership by the Member States and leadership by the 
Commission. However, on both these factors, practice in reality was not deemed to be 
particularly good, with leadership by the Member States weaker than leadership by the 
Commission.   
The volume of resources available to the Commission was where the EU/EC scored most 
highly but, disjunctively, this was deemed to be the least important factor determining  
how well the EU/EC performs. After volume of resources, respondents believed that the 
Commission performed particularly well in its accountability to Member States. Account-
ability of the Member States to the Commission, however, and the willingness of the Member 
States to ‘let the Commission get on with it’ were the areas in which EU/EC performance was 
Figure 7: Comparison of the importance of the EU’s ability to deliver specific outputs and its  
 delivery in practice 
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believed to be worst.  This would seem to indicate a leaning towards a more cooperativist 
approach amongst respondents; greater consolidation in terms of additional resources was 
seen to be least important – although not necessarily undesirable – in determining better 
performance.    
 
 
e. The EC’s future role 
Respondents were asked to state in which areas they believed the EC should play a smaller or 
greater role in the future, compared to Member States (Figure 9). Consensus-building, 
advocacy and target-setting was believed to be the area in which the EC should play the 
greatest role, followed closely by an increased role in the preparation and negotiation of 
international treaties and conventions.  The area in which it was felt the EC needed to increase 
its role least was in direct action.   
Respondents were finally asked to express how strongly they opposed or supported a given 
set of possible changes to the EC’s role in tackling global problems (Figure 10). There was 
strongest support for working together and being accountable on delivering the Accra Agenda 
for Action, followed by enforcing the code of conduct on division of labour. There was 
considerable support for speaking with one seat and one voice at international meetings, but 
less support for introducing new codes of conduct. There was least support for the proposal to 
spend a greater share of the EU development cooperation budget through the EC.   
Figure 8: Comparison of the relative importance of determinants of EU/EC performance in  
 development cooperation with their performance in practice 
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Figure 9: Areas in which the EC should play a greater role in the future 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own compilation 
Figure 10: Support for a given set of possible changes to the EC’s role in tackling global  
 problems 
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Summarising the results of the expert survey, five conclusions stand out: 
— First, there is tension over the objectives of policy and fear that the poverty focus of 
development cooperation will be overtaken by issue of domestic concern, such as energy 
security, migration and terrorism. 
— Second, there is support for the idea of working together as Europeans, justified by 
shared values, and supported by the possibility of economies of scale. There is little 
enthusiasm for the opportunities of greater consolidation offered by the Lisbon Treaty. 
— Third, there are thought to have been improvements in EC performance, but there 
remains a marked gap between the added-value the EC is seen as having the potential to 
bring, and value-added actually brought. 
— Fourth, this is matched by a large shortfall in terms of all the success factors which shape 
the EC’s performance, both internal to the EC and with respect to Member States. 
— Fifth, there is support for cooperative approaches, but much less for consolidation, at 
least in terms of spending a greater share of aid funds through the Brussels budget. 
Some of these conclusions are reflected in comments by respondents at the end of the survey 
on what changes they would most like to see in European development cooperation in the 
coming years. They are summarised in Box 1.   
 
Box 1: Respondent comments 
¾ “What I would like to see is a strengthening of the European Consensus on Development to obtain more 
and more European positions on the various issues and speak and negotiate with one voice in 
international fora”  
¾ “A move from rhetoric ‘we have committed € x million […]’ to action ‘We have made impact in these 
areas […]’” 
¾ “One approach in development; less spending of money; more definition of joint approaches and 
standards” 
¾ “Better mobilise synergies of various EU actors – a combination of specific comparative advantages” 
¾ “EU should speak more with one voice, on development and other policy areas that impact on achieving 
development objectives”  
¾ “Much closer co-operation and co-ordination between the EC and the Member States” 
¾ “Less money and less bureaucracy, better results, more flexibility” 
¾ “Strong leadership + effective delivery = the EU becomes the major player the world needs and the EU 
deserves to be” 
5 Conclusion 
The paper began by arguing that there were two visions of the future of European devel-
opment cooperation, consolidationist and cooperativist. At first sight, the emerging devel-
opment agenda might suggest a consolidationist solution, emphasising as it does the im-
portance of “joined-up thinking”, policy coherence and collective solutions to emerging 
global problems. The EC itself has made the case for progressively greater consolidation. 
This will not be easy to deliver, however. Theory and past experience both suggest that the 
determinants of consolidation are not fully in place. These include the distribution of legal 
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competences in the EU, institutional factors, the Member States’ constellation of interests, and 
values.   
An expert survey confirms the need for caution. There is some enthusiasm for greater 
cooperation, not much for greater consolidation.   
Four conclusions can be suggested: 
First, it is worth bearing in mind that the scope for pendulum swings is partly shaped by the 
Treaty. There is little point, for example, in arguing for less consolidation on trade policy or 
more on foreign and security policy, unless the argument is also to change the treaty. Legal 
competence is a determining factor, although not the only one. 
Second, a theoretical implication is that no single integration theory, no single variable 
explains the location of the pendulum. Policy areas and the distribution of legal competences 
in the EU, institutional factors, the Member States’ constellation of interests and identity all 
need to be taken into account.   
Third, it looks as though the “quick wins” will be on the cooperation side of the pendulum: in 
setting standards and targets, working together on aid effectiveness, and improving infor-
mation collection and dissemination. 
Fourth, the arguments for future consolidation are not negligible. The case will need to be 
made more strongly, however. 
In practical terms, the cooperation-consolidation debate will play out in Brussels in the 
context of the new institutional architecture and the evolving development agenda. The 
establishment of the European External Action Service will result in some of the chess pieces 
being moved around the board – in particular, some policy and programming responsibilities 
units moving into the new EEAS.  An overarching question will be: what capacity is needed 
to run a global development programme, including a € 10 billion per year aid agency? 
Inevitably the EC will need to strengthen its infrastructure. As it does so, further consolidation 
may well become more attractive.  Demonstrable success will breed greater consolidation. 
 
Consolidation or cooperation: The future of EU development cooperation 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 19 
Bibliography 
Checkel, J. (1999):Social construction and integration, in: Journal of European Public Policy 
6 (4), 549 
Coeuré, B. / J. Pisani-Ferry (2007): The governance of the European Union’s international 
economic relations: how many voices?, in: A. Sapir (ed.), Fragmented power: Europe and 
the Global Economy, Brussels: Bruegel, 29–31 
DFID (Department for International Development) (2009): Eliminating world poverty: 
building our common future; online: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/whitepaper/ 
building-our-common-future.pdf 
EuropeAid (2009): Annual report on the European Community’s development and external 
assistance policies and their implementation in 2008, 6; online: http://ec.europa.eu/ 
europeaid/multimedia/publications/ publications/ annual-reports/2009_en.htm 
EC (European Commission) (2005): The European consensus on development; online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf 
– (2007): EU Code of conduct on division of labour in development policy; online: http:// 
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0072:FIN:EN:PDF 
– (2009a): Annual report on the European Community’s development and external assistance 
policies and their implementation in 2008; online: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ 
multimedia/publications/publications/annual-reports/2009_en.htm 
– (2009b): Report on policy coherence for development, SEC (2009) 1137 final; online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/SEC_PDF_2009_1137_F_ACTE_PC
D_EN.pdf 
European Think-Tanks Group (2010): New challenges, new beginnings: next steps in 
European development cooperation; online: http://www.pagegangster.com/p/yrrY0/ 
Groenleer, M. / L. van Schaik (2007): United we stand? The European Union’s international 
actorness in the cases of the international criminal court and the Kyoto Protocol, in: 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(5), 972 
Gstöhl, S. (2008): Patchwork power Europe? The EU’s representation in international 
institutions, Bruges: College of Europe 
Keukeleire, S. / J. MacNaughtan (2008): Theorising EU foreign policy, in: S. Keukeleire / J. 
MacNaughtan (eds.), The foreign policy of the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 328 
Maxwell, S. (1999): Global governance: an agenda for the renewal of the United Nations?, 
London: ODI (ODI Briefing Papers 2) 
– (2006): What’s next in international development? Perspectives from the 20 % Club and  
the 0.2 % Club, London: ODI (ODI Working Papers 270); online: http://www.odi.org. 
uk/resources/download/1528.pdf 
– (2007): Ten steps to a new development agenda, London: ODI (ODI Opinions 84) 
Moravcsik, A. (1998): The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to 
Maastricht, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, chapter 1 
Pupcenoks, J. (2008): Unilateralism and multilateralism in European Union’s international 
trade and beyond, Newark, Del.: University of Delaware 
OECD/DAC (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development 
Assistance Committee) (1996): Shaping the 21st century: the contribution of development 
cooperation, Paris 
 Mikaela Gavas / Deborah Johnson / Simon Maxwell 
20 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Reiter, J. (2005): The European Union as actor in international relations: the role of the 
external environment for EU institutional design, in: O. Elgström / C. Jönsson (eds.), 
European Union negotiations: processes, networks and institutions, London: Routledge, 
151 
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (2007): Official journal of the European Union C115 
Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (2008): online: Obstinate or obsolete? A 
reappraisal in the light of the new dynamism of the EC, in: Millennium 20 (1), 4–6 
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (1990): Human development report, New 
York: Oxford University Press   
Wendt, A. (1999): Social theory of international politics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 135 
World Bank (1990): World Development Report, New York: Oxford University Press 
WRR Scientific Council for Government Policy (2010): Less pretention, more ambition: 
development aid that makes a difference: conclusion of WRR Report, 84; online: 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/26839858/Development-Aid-That-Makes-a-Difference  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 
 
  
  
 
 
Consolidation or cooperation: The future of EU development cooperation 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 23
Questionnaire 
The overall purpose of the questionnaire is to seek your views on the likely range of 
international problems over the next decade and the desirability and scope for EC action in 
dealing with them.  
Section 1 – About you 
1. Your role (tick one) 
a. EC civil servant 
b. National civil servant 
c. Academic/think-tank 
d. Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) 
e. Politician 
f. Media 
g. Other (please specify) 
2. Your country  
 
Section 2 – Issues in EU policy-making  
3.  How important do you think the following global issues will be in EU policy-
making over the next decade? (NB. in the following question, we ask how 
important you think the following issues should be in EU policy-making). 
Accepting that all problems are inter- connected, please score each from 1= not at 
all important to 5= very important   
a. Poverty reduction and human development 
b. Climate change 
c. Fragile states 
d. Financial crises 
e. Terrorism 
f. Peace and security 
g. Drugs 
h. Pandemics 
i. Trade policy 
j. Migration 
k. Energy security 
l. Global food security 
m. Natural disasters 
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4.  How important do you think the following global issues should be in EU policy-
making over the next decade? Again, accepting that all problems are inter-
connected, please score each from 1= not at all important to 5= very important   
a. Poverty reduction and human development 
b. Climate change 
c. Fragile states 
d. Financial crises 
e. Terrorism 
f. Peace and security 
g. Drugs 
h. Pandemics 
i. Trade policy 
j. Migration 
k. Energy security 
l. Global food security 
m. Natural disasters 
5.   In tackling these, how important do you think international collective action will 
be in each case, as opposed to action by national governments?  Please score on 
the scale of 1-5 below.  (Scale: 1 International collective action much more 
important than national action; 2 International collective action a little more 
important than national action; 3 Both equally important; 4 National action a little 
more important than international collective action; 5 National action much more 
important than international collective action) 
a. Poverty reduction and human development 
b. Climate change 
c. Fragile states 
d. Financial crises 
e. Terrorism 
f. Peace and security 
g. Drugs 
h. Pandemics 
i. Trade policy 
j. Migration 
k. Energy security 
l. Global food security 
m. Natural disasters 
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6.  Overall, do you think that international collective action will be more or less 
important in the coming decade than before? Please score on a scale of 1–5, where 
1 = not at all important and 5 = very important.  
Section 3 – The role of the EC 
7.  The EC is not exactly a multilateral actor like the World Bank or the UN. 
Nevertheless, it acts in multilateral space. The EC is often said to have specific 
comparative advantage in the following areas. How important do you think these 
are? Please score from 1 = not at all important to 5 = very important. 
a. Shared values. 
b. A commitment to poverty reduction in the world. 
c. Shared approaches in development policy, laid out in the European Consensus 
on Development. 
d. New structures, particularly the new High Representative (as de facto ‘Foreign 
Minister’), leading the European External Action Service, as well as there 
being a team of Commissioners in development, humanitarian aid and crisis 
response, trade, and enlargement and neighbourhood policy. 
e. A variety of international political and economic partnerships, including with 
ACP countries, through the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, but also (and 
with varying degrees of contractuality and mutual accountability) with Asia, 
Latin America, the Mediterranean, the European Neighbourhood and the 
entire African continent. 
f. Economies of scale in funding instruments.  
g. Other (please specify) 
 
8.  Multilateral organisations commonly deliver a range of outputs. How important is 
it that EC deliver the following outputs? Please score from 1 = not at all important 
to 5 = very important. 
a. Information collection and dissemination  
b. Technical co-ordination and standard-setting 
c. Jointly-undertaken research on cross-cutting issues 
d. Consensus-building, advocacy, and target-setting 
e. The preparation and negotiation of international treaties or conventions  
f. Co-ordination of action among agencies, both national and international  
g. Direct action (development, humanitarian, peace-keeping) 
9.  How well do you think the EC delivers the various outputs, compared to other 
multilateral organisations?  Please score from 1-5, where 1 = very badly and 5 = 
very well.  = not at all important to 5 = very important. 
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a. Information collection and dissemination  
b. Technical co-ordination and standard-setting 
c. Jointly-undertaken research on cross-cutting issues 
d. Consensus-building, advocacy, and target-setting 
e. The preparation and negotiation of international treaties or conventions 
f. Co-ordination of action among agencies, both national and international 
g. Direct action (development, humanitarian, peace-keeping) 
 
10.  Taking account of all its outputs and roles, the scale of its activity as well as 
quality, how well do you think the EC delivers on the following areas? Please 
score on a scale of 1–5, where 1 = very badly and 5 = very well.   
a. Poverty reduction and human development 
b. Climate change 
c. Fragile states 
d. Financial crises 
e. Terrorism 
f. Peace and security 
g. Drugs 
h. Pandemics 
i. Trade policy 
j. Migration 
k. Energy security 
l. Global food security 
m. Natural disasters 
 
11.  Overall, how well do you think the EC is currently performing in the sphere of 
development cooperation? Please score on a scale of 1–5, where 1= very poorly 
and 5=very well.   
 
12.  How do you think the EC performs today compared to ten years ago? Please score 
from 1=much worse to 5=much better. 
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Section 4 – Explaining EC performance 
13.   How important do you think are the following factors in determining how well the 
EC performs in the sphere of development cooperation? Please score from 1=not 
at all important to 5=very important 
a. Leadership by the Member States 
b. Leadership by the Commission 
c. Quality of oversight by the Member States 
d. Willingness of Member States to ‘let the Commission get on with it’ 
e. Accountability of the Commission to Member States 
f. Accountability of the Member States to the Commission 
g. Volume of resources available to the Commission 
h. Number and quality of staff available to the Commission 
i. Quality of knowledge generation and management in the Commission 
j. Quality of overseas Delegations 
k. Contribution by the European Parliament 
 
14.   And how would you score the EU/EC on these factors? Please score from 1=very 
poor to 5=very good. 
a. Leadership by the Member States 
b. Leadership by the Commission 
c. Quality of oversight by the Member States 
d. Willingness of Member States to ‘let the Commission get on with it’ 
e. Accountability of the Commission to Member States 
f. Accountability of the Member States to the Commission 
g. Volume of resources available to the Commission 
h. Number and quality of staff available to the Commission 
i. Quality of knowledge generation and management in the Commission 
j. Quality of overseas Delegations 
k. Contribution by the European Parliament 
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Section 5 – Future policy choices by the EC 
15.   Compared to Member States, do you think the EC should in the future play a 
smaller or greater role in the future than in the past in the following areas? Please 
score from 1 = much smaller to 5 = much greater. 
a. Information collection and dissemination  
b. Technical co-ordination and standard-setting 
c. Jointly-undertaken research on cross-cutting issues 
d. Consensus-building, advocacy, and target-setting 
e. The preparation and negotiation of international treaties or conventions  
f. Co-ordination of action among agencies, both national and international  
g. Direct action (development, humanitarian, peace-keeping) 
 
16.  More specifically, how strongly do you oppose or support the following possible 
changes to the EC role in tackling global problems. Please score from 1 = strongly 
oppose to 5 = strongly support. 
a. Spend a greater share of the EU development cooperation budget through the 
EC (currently 20 %) 
b. Enforce the code of conduct on division of labour 
c. Introduce new Codes of Conduct (for example on global and vertical funds) 
d. Work together and be accountable on delivering the Accra Agenda for Action 
e. Speak with one seat and one voice at international meetings (e.g. G20, 
UNFCCC) 
 
17.  Finally, please summarise in a few words the change in EC development 
cooperation you would most like to see in the coming years.   
 
 
 
